Philosophy of science has undergone a naturalistic turn, moving away from traditional idealized concerns with the logical structure of scientific theories and toward focusing on real-world scientific practice, especially in domains such as modeling and experimentation. As part of this shift, recent work has explored how the project of philosophically understanding science as a natural phenomenon can be enriched by drawing from different fields and disciplines, including niche construction theory in evolutionary biology, on the one hand, and ecological and enactive (...) views in embodied cognitive science, on the other. But these insights have so far been explored in separation from each other, without clear indication of whether they can work together. Moreover, the focus on particular practices, however insightful, has tended to lack consideration of potential further implications for a naturalized understanding of science as a whole (i.e., above and beyond those particular practices). Motivated by these developments, here we sketch a broad-ranging view of science, scientific practice and scientific knowledge in terms of ecological-enactive co-construction. The view we propose situates science in the biological, evolutionary context of human embodied cognitive activity aimed at addressing the demands of life. This motivates reframing theory as practice, and reconceptualizing scientific knowledge in ecological terms, as relational and world-involving. Our view also brings to the forefront of attention the fundamental link between ideas about the nature of mind, of science and of nature itself, which we explore by outlining how our proposal differs from more conservative, and narrower, conceptions of “cognitive niche construction.”. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of divine revelation as presented by Blaise Pascal, examining the fundamental dichotomy between the hidden and revealed aspects of God. Beginning with the premise of human existence as inherently obscure and lost in the universe without apparent reason, the study delves into Pascal’s inquiry into the origins of human existence and the role of God as both a part of and apart from this primordial darkness. Pascal’s reflections on the incomprehensibility of man before that of (...) God highlight a foundational obscurity, setting the stage for a deeper investigation into the nature of divine revelation. The article contrasts Pascal’s perspective with traditional theological and philosophical views, particularly in relation to the manifest nature of God as commonly interpreted through natural phenomena. It further delves into Pascal’s interpretation of scriptural passages, notably Isaiah 45:15, emphasizing the notion of Deus Absconditus (Hidden God) and its critical role in understanding the paradoxical nature of divine revelation. The article examines how Pascal perceives God’s manifestation through various historical and mystical dimensions, including nature, the Incarnation, and the Eucharist, each revealing God while simultaneously concealing Him. (shrink)

Psychology has a WEIRD problem. It is overly reliant on participants from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies. Over the last decade this problem has come to be widely acknowledged, yet there has been little progress toward making psychology more diverse. This Element proposes that the lack of progress can be explained by the fact that the original WEIRD critique was too narrow in scope. Rather than a single problem of a lack of diversity among research participants, there are (...) at least four overlapping problems. Psychology is WEIRD not only in terms of who makes up its participant pool, but also in terms of its theoretical commitments, methodological assumptions, and institutional structures. Psychology as currently constituted is a fundamentally WEIRD enterprise. Coming to terms with this is necessary if we wish to make psychology relevant for all humanity. (shrink)

An intuitive view is that creativity involves bringing together what is already known and familiar in a way that produces something new. In cognitive science, this intuition is typically formalized in terms of computational processes that combine or associate internally represented information. From this computationalist perspective, it is hard to imagine how non-representational approaches in embodied cognitive science could shed light on creativity, especially when it comes to abstract conceptual reasoning of the kind scientists so often engage in. The present (...) article offers an entry point to addressing this challenge. The scientific project of embodied cognitive science is a continuation of work in the functionalist tradition in psychology developed over a century ago by William James and John Dewey, among others. The focus here is on how functionalist views on the nature of mind, thought, and experience offer an alternative starting point for cognitive science in general, and for the cognitive science of scientific creativity in particular. The result may seem paradoxical. On the one hand, the article claims that the functionalist conceptual framework motivates rejecting mainstream cognitive views of creativity as the combination or association of ideas. On the other hand, however, the strategy adopted here—namely, revisiting ideas from functionalist psychology to inform current scientific theorizing—can itself be described as a process of arriving at new, creative ideas from combinations of old ones. As is shown here, a proper understanding of cognition in light of the functionalist tradition resolves the seeming tension between these two claims. (shrink)

A popular trend in the sciences of the mind is to understand cognition as embodied, embedded, enactive, ecological, and so on. While some of the work under the label of “embodied cognition” takes for granted key commitments of traditional cognitive science, other projects coincide in treating embodiment as the starting point for an entirely different way of investigating all of cognition. Focusing on the latter, this paper discusses how embodied cognitive science can be made more reflexive and more sensitive to (...) the implications that our views of cognition have for how we understand scientific practice, including our own theorizing about cognition. Inspired by the “strong programme” in the sociology of scientific knowledge, I explore the prospect of an analogously “strong” program in embodied cognitive science. I first draw from Dewey’s transactional notion of “situation” to identify a broad sense in which embodied cognitive science takes cognition, as an embodied phenomenon, to be _situated_. I then sketch a perspective I call _situated reflexivity_, which extends the Deweyan analysis to understand scientific practice in the same terms, and thereby illustrates what research in line with a strong program in embodied cognitive science can look like. This move, I propose, has the potential of setting up a new inquiry situation that makes more salient the embodiment of scientific practice and that, through this, can help organize our own embodied cognitive activities as we try to make sense of scientific work, including our own. (shrink)

Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the proper level(s) of explanation. Views range from reductionist, favoring only neuroscience explanations, to mechanist, favoring the integration of multiple levels, to pluralist, favoring the preservation of even the most general, high-level explanations, such as those provided by embodied or dynamical approaches. In this paper, we challenge this framing. We suggest that these are not different levels of explanation at all but, rather, different styles of explanation that capture (...) different, cross-cutting patterns in cognitive phenomena. Which pattern is explanatory depends on both the cognitive phenomenon under investigation and the research interests occasioning the explanation. This reframing changes how we should answer the basic questions of which cognitive science approaches explain and how these explanations relate to one another. On this view, we should expect different approaches to offer independent explanations in terms of their different focal patterns and the value of those explanations to partly derive from the broad patterns they feature. (shrink)

English summary: Kant described phenomenology as that which comes from us, and that which comes to us, a duality that leads towards the theological horizon. Kant opened a field of inquiry that historical phenomenology, born with Husserl and Heidegger, repeated. As with any repetition, criticisms of this do exist, but the dominant theme of its call is there, as well as the question: which voice do we hear? There are many shapes for this call, but each time there is the (...) law and the summons to be, the summons to change your life. Just as there is perhaps God. French description: La phenomenologie n'a pas a inventer les phenomenes - sinon comme on dit inventer un tresor - mais a les faire voir, ou entendre. Kant s'y emploie a sa maniere lorsqu'il fait entendre le ton de voix lie a l'imperatif categorique, celui d'une voix d'airain. C'est la reconduire la pensee a l'eclat d'un fait premier ou puiser ensuite ses ressources: il y a la loi. Kant le decrit comme un appel, a defaut de tout a fait le nommer ainsi, l'interpretant ensuite tout a la fois comme ce qui vient de nous (comme si le sujet ethique se donnait a lui-meme la loi) et ce qui vient a nous (comme si ce meme sujet repondait a la loi venue de Dieu). Prendre au serieux cette dualite suppose que le chantier kantien de l'ethique ouvre alors sur un horizon theologique. Kant ouvre un chantier que la phenomenologie historique, celle qui nait avec Husserl et Heidegger, repete. Comme toute vraie repetition, celle-ci ne va pas sans critique ni deplacement (Merleau-Ponty, Scheler, Jonas), mais le motif de l'appel est bel et bien la. Nous avons ete appeles - la trace laissee en nous par cet appel est trop forte pour que le moindre doute puisse encore s'elever a son propos, mais la question vient aussitot: quelle voix s'est fait entendre? Quel appel nous surprend et nous souleve? Appel de l'etre (Martin Heidegger), appel de l'Autre (Emmanuel Levinas) ou appel de la vie (Michel Henry)? Nous avons ete appeles, affectes, blesses - ce qui brise la vie lui appartient encore, mais qu'est-ce donc qui la brise et la releve? Multiples sont les figures de l'appel, mais a chaque fois il y a la loi et cette injonction d'etre - cette injonction silencieuse a laquelle le poete aura donne son exacte formule: Tu dois changer ta vie (Rilke). Comme il y a peut-etre Dieu. (shrink)

In this article, the French philosopher Jérôme de Gramont evaluates the modes in which twentieth century philosophy and literature—from Heidegger and Derrida to Blanchot and Beckett—aim to think our being-in-the-world beyond the concept of “man” and without the genus of the human.

Explanatory diversity is a salient feature of the sciences of the mind, where different projects focus on neural, psychological, cognitive, social or other explanations. The same happens within embodied cognitive science, where ecological, enactive, dynamical, phenomenological and other approaches differ from each other in their explanations of the embodied mind. As traditionally conceived, explanatory diversity is philosophically problematic, fueling debates about whether the different explanations are competing, compatible, or tangential. In contrast, this paper takes the perspective of embodied cognitive science (...) as its starting point and accordingly approaches explanatory diversity not as a problem to be solved, but as a phenomenon to be understood. Recent work has explored how the view of cognition as embodied motivates reflexively viewing science as a situated embodied cognitive practice. Here I argue that this reflexive turn motivates adopting a pluralistic stance when it comes to questions about theoretical and methodological disagreements. In particular, it motivates moving away from thinking in terms of explanations as disembodied entities that compete with one another, and instead thinking in terms of different explanatory styles as embodied practices of explaining, many of which might be legitimate and warranted independently of whether and how the explanations themselves relate to one another. (shrink)

Every reader of Ricœur knows that hermeneutics endeavors to answer the aporiae of historical phenomenology. Hence arises the need to return to those aporiae and those answers. On the one hand, phenomenology, born with the maxim of going “directly to things themselves,” is confronted with the incessant evasion of the thing itself and with its dreams of presence being thereby shattered. This reversal should not be blamed on the failings of this or that thinker, but attributed to the very destiny (...) of phenomenology itself. On the other hand, Ricœurian hermeneutics takes note of a gap, and of a necessary return. Thus, there is nothing for thought itself to grieve over with respect to this enterprise. However, while the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, faced with the same difficulties, orients itself towards political philosophy, the hermeneutics of Ricœur rather seeks to lead us to a philosophy of religion. This article hypothesizes that, in spite of the formula of a “philosophy without an absolute,” the thought of Ricœur heads in fair measure towards the Absolute, and that ontology is not the only name of the Promised Land. (shrink)

Every reader of Ricoeur knows that hermeneutics endeavors to answer the aporiae of historical phenomenology. Hence arises the need to return to those aporiae and those answers. On the one hand, phenomenology, born with the maxim of going “directly to things themselves,” is confronted with the incessant evasion of the thing itself and with its dreams of presence being thereby shattered. This reversal should not be blamed on the failings of this or that thinker, but attributed to the very destiny (...) of phenomenology itself. On the other hand, Ricoeurian hermeneutics takes note of a gap, and of a necessary return. Thus, there is nothing for thought itself to grieve over with respect to this enterprise. However, while the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, faced with the same difficulties, orients itself towards political philosophy, the hermeneutics of Ricoeur rather seeks to lead us to a philosophy of religion. This article hypothesizes that, in spite of the formula of a “philosophy without an absolute,” the thought of Ricoeur heads in fair measure towards the Absolute, and that ontology is not the only name of the Promised Land. (shrink)

On the face of it, the perspective that Casper puts forward in his paper (Chap. 2) and the one I offer in mine (Chap. 4)are completely at odds with each other. He sees the current diversity of explanations, theories and methods in embodied cognitive science as problematic and calling for some kind of integration, whereas I defend an extreme pluralist stance and don’t see the diversity as a problem. Not only that, but while he argues for coordination between the disparate (...) approaches, I propose that expecting such coordination is in many cases unrealistic and moreover that, even when it’s possible, it might be counterproductive. The straightforward thing to do now would be for me to double down and use this space to try to show why I’m right and Casper is wrong. But I don’t think he’s wrong. He and I do disagree, but I don’t think it’s that sort of disagreement where only one side can be right and the other must be wrong. In particular, I don’t think that focusing on the different conclusions he and I draw in our respective chapters is a fruitful way to understand the nature of our disagreement. My goal in this commentary will be to explain why. I don’t know if Casper will agree with my assessment or not, but I won’t be surprised if he doesn’t—in fact, as I will suggest, this would make perfect sense given what I propose in my chapter. Still, my hope is that, by clarifying how (from my perspective) our different views relate to each other, I can help some readers better appreciate both his proposal and mine. (shrink)

For decades now a research question has firmly established itself as a staple of psychological and neuroscientific investigations on language, namely the question of whether and how bilingualism is cognitively beneficial, detrimental or neutral. As more and more studies appear every year, it seems as though the research question itself is firmly grounded and can be answered if only we use the right experimental manipulations and subject the data to the right analysis methods and interpretive lens. In this paper we (...) propose that, rather than merely improving prior methods in the pursuit of evidence in one direction or another, we would do well to carefully consider whether the research question itself is as firmly grounded as it might appear to be. We identify two bodies of research that suggest the research question to be highly problematic. In particular, drawing from work in sociolinguistics and in embodied cognitive science, we argue that the research question of whether bilingualism is cognitively advantageous or not is based on problematic assumptions about language and cognition. Once these assumptions are addressed head on, a straightforward answer to the question arises, but the question itself comes to seem to be a poor starting point for research. After examining why this is so, we conclude by exploring some implications for future research. (shrink)

L'oeuvre d'Henri Maldiney (1912-2013) occupe aujourd'hui une place de premier ordre dans le paysage philosophique. Lors même qu'il n'a que tardivement publié son premier ouvrage, Regard Parole Espace, en 1973, le profond renouvellement qu'il a su introduire au sein de la phénoménologie a obligé philosophes, mais aussi psychiatres ou théoriciens de l'oeuvre d'art, à repenser leurs concepts comme leurs pratiques. C'est là ce que ces études, initialement issues d'un colloque interdisciplinaire, entendent méditer. Elles abordent aussi bien la place qui est (...) celle de Maldiney au sein de la tradition philosophique, qu'elles réfléchissent à l'impact de sa pensée sur le traitement des questions psychiatriques et esthétiques. (shrink)

Première partie : Trois chemins. Trois commencements -- Entre sans-nom et nom propre -- L'entre-deux -- Deuxieme partie : Dans ces jours qui sont incertains. Éloge de l'inquiétude : À propos de l'Éloge de la philosophie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty -- La pensée sans autorité : À partir de Blanchot et Wittgenstein -- L'autorité en défaut : sur l'oeuvre de Kierkegaard -- Troisième partie: Vers le nom propre. L'arc herméneutique d'Emmanuel Falque -- Acheminement vers nom : À partir de Jean-Luc Nancy (...) -- Regards sur Celui que est : En marge de Romano Guardini -- Fin: Apologie du Judgment dernier. (shrink)

Are the theoretical frameworks of phenomenology and of science compatible? And, if so, what would a reconciliation entail for science as it is practiced? Gallagher [2019] poses these two questions, answering the first in the affirmative and leaving the second unaddressed. I argue that treating the two as separate questions presupposes an inadequate distinction between theory and practice that Gallagher’s non-reductive framework motivates rejecting. Recognizing the intertwining of theory and practice allows us to answer Gallagher’s two questions about phenomenology and (...) science all at once, but it also motivates a less conciliatory conclusion than the one he offers. (shrink)

Au commencement de la vie religieuse, il pourrait y avoir un verbe humain fait de plus de doute que de savoir, de plus d’inévidence que d’évidence. Deux vers du poète Jules Supervielle portent jusqu’à une expression claire cette expérience encore obscure : Voilà que je me surprends à t’adresser la parole, Mon Dieu, moi qui ne sais encore si tu existes. Ces deux vers constituent l’incipit d’un poème intitulé « Prière à l’inconnu » publié dans le recueil La Fable du (...) monde, et sont cités surtout... (shrink)

C’est en philosophe que Jan Patočka entreprend de répondre à la crise de l’Europe et aux désastres de l’histoire auxquels il est confronté, en revenant à la naissance de la philosophie, non pas dans un simple souci d’histoire, mais en vue d’un nouveau commencement. Il s’appuiera pour cela sur Platon (« Le platonisme négatif », Platon et l’Europe) puis sur les présocratiques (notamment sur Héraclite, dans ses Essais hérétiques sur la philosophie de l’histoire). C’est alors qu’il peut montrer comment la (...) crise s’inscrit dans la physis et pas seulement dans l’histoire, mais aussi comment, dans l’histoire, des hommes peuvent se dresser pour atteindre un « plus-haut ». (shrink)

En 1972, Emmanuel Levinas ouvre l’article qu’il consacre à Paul Celan par une citation justement célèbre : « Je ne vois pas de différence entre une poignée de mains et un poème ». Ce que voit Paul Celan dans une poignée de mains mériterait assurément de longs commentaires, ce qu’entend Emmanuel Levinas dans ce poème élémentaire est et n’est pas plus simple. D’une certaine manière, la poignée de mains ne dit rien mais elle dit : simple signe lancé à l’autre, (...) elle se résume dans un dire sans di... (shrink)

Este trabalho pretende aproximar o processo de aprendizagem histórica, preconizado pela Didática da História, à proposta da pedagogia da memória, empreendida pelo programa educativo Jóvenes y Memoria: recordamos para el futuro, organizado pela Comisión Provincial por la Memoria da província de Buenos Aires. Para isso, a análise se dedicará à compreensão do planejamento institucional do programa e de suas etapas teórico-metodológicas, ambos apresentados no informe “20 años del programa Jóvenes y Memoria” (2021) e na convocatória e cronograma de etapas do (...) ano de 2023. Para assim, buscar semelhanças entre as propostas, em que se destaca a centralidade da construção de narrativas históricas e elaborações de memórias, baseadas no cotidiano e na comunidade local, e a mobilização, em seu sentido emancipatório, das consciências históricas associadas à vida prática dos jovens. Em que foi possível observar o enfoque semelhante que ambas perspectivas outorgam à temporalidade passado-futuro a partir da transformação do presente para deslumbrar horizontes de expectativas. (shrink)

Representationalism—the view that scientific modeling is best understood in representational terms—is the received view in contemporary philosophy of science. Contributions to this literature have focused on a number of puzzles concerning the nature of representation and the epistemic role of misrepresentation, without considering whether these puzzles are the product of an inadequate analytical framework. The goal of this paper is to suggest that this possibility should be taken seriously. The argument has two parts, employing the “can’t have” and “don’t need” (...) tactics drawn from philosophy of mind. On the one hand, I propose that representationalism doesn’t work: different ways to flesh out representationalism create a tension between its ontological and epistemological components and thereby undermine the view. On the other hand, I propose that representationalism is not needed in the first place—a position I articulate based on a pragmatic stance on the success of scientific research and on the feasibility of alternative philosophical frameworks. I conclude that representationalism is untenable and unnecessary, a philosophical dead end. A new way of thinking is called for if we are to make progress in our understanding of scientific modeling. (shrink)

Neste artigo mostra-se os resultados de uma busca em bases de dados internacionais sobre a teoria do agir comunicativo de Habermas na área da Administração de Organizações. A teoria de Habermas foi desenvolvida após a sua guinada linguística, de ruptura com a filosofia da consciência e a metafísica em 1981. Nela os usos da linguagem são modos de expressão e representação, mas também modo de construção de vínculos sociais. A partir desta teoria, Habermas desenvolve a ideia de discurso como agir (...) comunicativo orientado para o entendimento, e elabora uma ética do discurso e uma política deliberativa. A entrada da obra de Habermas na Administração antecede a sua guinada linguística, e deve ser destacado o uso da sua tese "Mudança estrutural da esfera pública". Neste artigo quer-se destacar as relações estabelecidas entre a filosofia da linguagem e a Administração, tanto em acordos teóricos quanto práticos. Entre os aspectos teóricos destaca-se os estudos teóricos do conhecimento, incluindo a epistemologia. Entre os aspectos práticos estão as questões da filosofia prática, a ética e a política. Quer-se assim apresentar o potencial da filosofia de Habermas para pesquisa e trabalho na Administração de Organizações. (shrink)

A powerful idea put forward in the recent philosophy of science literature is that scientific models are best understood as instruments, tools or, more generally, artifacts. This idea has thus far been developed in combination with the more traditional representational approach: accordingly, current artifactualist accounts treat models as representational tools. But artifactualism and representationalism are independent views, and adopting one does not require acceptance of the other. This paper argues that a leaner version of artifactualism, free of representationalist assumptions, is (...) both desirable and viable. Taking seriously the idea that models are artifacts can help us philosophically to make sense of how and why scientific modeling works even without reference to representation. (shrink)

A persistent criticism of radical embodied cognitive science is that it will be impossible to explain “real cognition” without invoking mental representations. This paper provides an account of explicit, real-time thinking of the kind we engage in when we imagine counter-factual situations, remember the past, and plan for the future. We first present a very general non-representational account of explicit thinking, based on pragmatist philosophy of science. We then present a more detailed instantiation of this general account drawing on nonlinear (...) dynamics and ecological psychology. (shrink)

The question whether cognition ever extends beyond the head is widely considered to be an empirical issue. And yet, all the evidence amassed in recent years has not sufficed to settle the debate. In this paper we suggest that this is because the debate is not really an empirical one, but rather a matter of definition. Traditional cognitive science can be identified as wedded to the ideals of “smallism” and “localism”. We criticize these ideals and articulate a case in favor (...) of extended cognition by highlighting the historical pedigree and conceptual adequacy of related empirical and theoretical work. (shrink)

Buscando identificar os aspectos informativas de prontuários de pacientes internados por motivações sociais no Hospital Psiquiátrico de Jurujuba em 1953 e de concepções foucaultianas sobre a construção da ‘loucura’ e do ‘louco’ na sua forte relação com modelo de sociedade, esta pesquisa indagou: se a loucura é uma construção social, que na modernidade implicou em segregação, qual a função do documento médico nesse processo? Espera-se que apresentem um conteúdo informativo sobre as doenças (viés informativo). Mas os prontuários daquela instituição não (...) apresentaram-se informativos sobre a loucura. O conflito entre um esperado viés informativo do documento e os nossos resultados levou a proposta de que faz-se necessário um exame mais holístico do valor político e social do documento médico. Propõe-se um exame mais ampliado do documento, enquanto materialidade recortada de determinado acontecimento, com função de modelação e controle, dentro de um dispositivo maior de verdade: o conhecimento e as instituições médico-científicas. O acesso à informação sobre os pacientes, se consequência de um processo de organização eficaz de conjuntos documentais em arquivos médicos, inicia-se pela escrita sobre o paciente que age como sentença (interne-se ou dê-se alta), mas há um silêncio sobre as práticas médicas de tratamento, pelo menos no período e na instituição investigada, que torna o sujeito internado objeto de práticas indescritíveis. Ao final da pesquisa conclui-se que aqueles documentos sobre o louco têm, pelo menos, três vieses passíveis de análise: o da autoria da escrita; o do objeto da escrita, e o viés institucional, ou sobre como o documento institui em alguns casos, na nossa sociedade, relações de poder. Um quarto viés que atravessa todos os outros, o do regime burocrático no qual estamos inseridos e que, por algum motivo, precisa passar pelo caminho do documento para cristalizar o seu poder. (shrink)